Answer to Question #71452 in Microeconomics for Abel

Question #71452
show that for all two person games in normal form the set of rationalizable equilibria is identical to the set of strategies that remain after iterated removal of strictly dominated strategies and therefore rationalizable
1
Expert's answer
2017-11-30T15:34:07-0500
In all two person games in normal form at the heart of strictly dominant strategies is the interaction of two players, that is, their decisions they take together, so if these strategies are removed, then there are strategies that decisions in which players took rationally, selfishly.

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