# Answer on Microeconomics Question for Halime

Question #6071

Anne and Per like talking to each other. There are N bars in their home town.

On Friday, Per and Anne simultaneously (but independently) decide which

bar to go to. If they happen to meet in the same bar, they both get a utility of 1.

If they do not meet, the utility is 0 for each of them.

Assume N = 2.

Write this game in normal form (matrix) and find all pure-strategy Nash

equilibria?

On Friday, Per and Anne simultaneously (but independently) decide which

bar to go to. If they happen to meet in the same bar, they both get a utility of 1.

If they do not meet, the utility is 0 for each of them.

Assume N = 2.

Write this game in normal form (matrix) and find all pure-strategy Nash

equilibria?

Expert's answer

Normal form:

[table] Anne Bar 1Bar 2PerBat 1

We have two points of Nash equilibrium – (1;1) and (1;1), from which any player could move to improve his

situation.

[table] Anne Bar 1Bar 2PerBat 1

**(1; 1)**(0; 0)Bar 2(0; 0)**(1; 1)**[/table]We have two points of Nash equilibrium – (1;1) and (1;1), from which any player could move to improve his

situation.

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